This year's European elections remain under the shadow of rising populism

The recent success of Donald Trump in the US presidential election and 2024 European election have illustrated the current wave of populism across the globe. Such rise of populism is fuelled by a powerful mix of socio-economic, cultural and political grievances.

In Europe, this has allowed populist parties from across the political spectrum to gain an even larger share of the seats in the new European Parliament, more generally reflecting the consolidation of populism in recent national elections.

The latest report of the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) examines the electoral performances of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. It offers a unique account of the diversity of populist parties in 26 EU member states (excluding Malta where no populist parties could be identified), with a focus on political dynamics, overall trends, and similarities and differences in the economic, social and political context of the European elections in the 27 EU member states.

Populist parties across the board have consolidated in the 2024 European elections, reflecting the increase in their number and geographical spread on the continent.

No less than 60 populist parties across 26 EU member states gained representation in the European Parliament in June 2024, as opposed to 40 populist parties in 22 EU countries in the 2019 election.

Overall, populist parties won a total 263 of the 720 seats — approximately 36%. Far-right parties such as the French RN and Italian Brothers of Italy scored the biggest win, while left-wing and centrist populists received comparatively less support.

Radical right-wing populists topped the polls in four countries (Austria, France, Hungary, and Italy). In another two countries (Bulgaria and the Czech Republic), centrist populists won the election.

Populism fuelled by the 'polycrisis'

Like in the US, the popularity of populism in Europe is rooted in the "polycrisis" that has unfolded since 2008 — the financial crisis, the 2015 refugee crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and now the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Each crisis has produced specific opportunities for populist mobilisation of economic anxiety, cultural fears, and political resentment.

In recent years, worsening economic conditions have heavily weighed on public opinion, fostering frustration and anger around the rising cost of living. Meanwhile, insecurities linked to immigration and cultural change have fuelled support for radical right-wing populism. In countries such as Hungary, Spain, and Italy, radical right-wing populists have also capitalised on threats to traditional culture by an alleged LGBTQ+ agenda.

Populists have been divided over other issues. Such fragmentation has emerged with regard to the European Green Deal, with populist radical-right parties attacking the environmental transition as being “punitive,” while left-wing populist parties have taken up environmental issues and endorsed the green transition.

The impact of the Israel–Hamas war and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza has varied across regions, featuring much more prominently in political discourse in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe, where the war in Ukraine has taken precedence.

While many populists from Western Europe have strategically toned down their support for Russia's Vladimir Putin to avoid political marginalisation, in Eastern Europe, we still find a number of starkly pro-Russian populist parties such as Vazrazhdane in Bulgaria, the SOS in Romania or the Czech SPD.

Varying performances have been also tied to the national electoral cycle. In countries where populists were in the opposition like Germany and France, these parties benefited from political discontent with national governments.

Populists in government had varying success in the 2024 European elections. While in Italy, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party convincingly won the elections, other parties, such as the Finns Party in Finland, paid the price for their participation in government.

How populism will impact EU politics

The 2024 European elections have delivered a new European Parliament whose centre of gravity has clearly shifted to the right and where the presence of populist actors has increased. However, these parties remain divided in the European Parliament, where they align with different groups and may also be found among the Non-inscrits (NI).

To the left, with a few notable exceptions, such as Fico’s SMER in Slovakia and the German BSW, populist parties are all found in the Left group in the European Parliament. Somewhat reflecting the diversity in their ideological profile, centrist populist parties are scattered across different groups, including the EPP and Renew Europe.

Fragmentation is more pronounced among radical right-wing and far-right populists, which are currently distributed across three different groups – namely, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Patriots for Europe (PfE), and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN).

Despite being divided, populist parties are increasingly more acceptable to the mainstream — a function of the dual process of modernisation and moderation by populists, on the one hand, and accommodation of populist ideas and policies by mainstream parties, on the other hand.

Moving away from their Brexit-era calls for “exits”, most populist parties have moderated or blurred their positions regarding European integration, calling instead for reforming the EU from within and for national sovereignty over supranational integration.

Such apparent moderation notwithstanding, populist parties of the right, in particular, will have greater influence over the EU agenda.

We can expect ad hoc coalitions on specific policy issues such as migration, climate change, EU enlargement, and support for Ukraine at a time when there are concerns that the new Trump administration may abandon Kyiv.

While the current EP majority may be able to effectively exercise a cordon sanitaire over both the far right and the far left, an overall shift to the right, both in terms of rhetoric and policy, is already a reality.

Gilles Ivaldi is Professor of Political Science at Sciences Po Paris, and Emilia Zankina is Associate Professor of Political Science, interim Vice Provost for Global Engagement and Dean of Temple University Rome.

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